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Abstract: Cervical cancer is one of the most preventable and curable forms of 
cancer. Since 1991 there has been a concerted effort in Australia to recommend and 
encourage women to have Pap smears every two years. Part of the success of this 
National Cervical Screening Program can be gauged by exploring the determinants of 
screening for cervical cancer among high-risk women and by addressing the specific 
question of whether screening is associated with socio-economic status. Accessibility 
to health services remains a core goal in health policy in Australia but evidence on 
whether the goal is being met is limited. Using unit record data from the 1995 
National Health Survey, an econometric model is developed for whether women have 
ever screened or not. A proportion of women in the sample contend that they have 
never heard of a Pap test. The analysis characterizes this group of women and 
accounts for their presence in our modelling. 
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Most research in consumer decision-making concentrates on the ultimate choice of 
whether to purchase or not when in fact this final decision is likely to be the result of a 
hierarchical system of decision states. In the first instance, consumers need to be 
aware of the existence of the product or service. Then they will typically acquire 
product information leading to some basic level of interest or disinterest. Only then is 
it possible for the product to be in the consumer’s choice set at which time there is a 
further set of decisions: conditional on wanting to purchase, can they afford it and if 
so when and if so what brand or type. 
 
It is easy to see the applicability of such a structure in the health context. New tests 
and products are continually being developed and knowledge about these will only 
gradually filter through to doctors and consumers. Even in the case of cervical 
screening, which is a relatively mature and well-known service, recent national 
surveys in Australia indicated that a substantial proportion (4% in 1995) of women 
had never heard of a Pap test. For these women, they have never had a test not 
because of any conscious choice but because they simply were not aware of its 
existence.  
 
From an econometric perspective the issue of whether a woman is aware of Pap tests 
presents a potential selection problem. What is of interest is a conditional probability 
of choosing to test given awareness. It is not appropriate to eliminate unaware women 
from the sample and analyse the choice behaviour of the subset of women who are 
aware of the Pap test unless the awareness and screening choices are independent. 
This would give the wrong conditional probability.  
 
There is also a problem if the entire sample is used with no differentiation made 
between non-screeners who are there by choice and those that are non-screeners 
because of lack of awareness. This would be the case if, as often happens, the 
awareness question was not asked and respondents were only asked whether they 
screened or not. Here the problem is that the hypothesized choice model is only 
appropriate for a subset of the sample. For those who are not aware, they will be non-
screeners irrespective of the values taken by the explanatory variables.  
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Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), econometric models are developed for whether 
women have ever screened for cervical cancer or not. Cervical cancer is one of the 
most preventable and curable forms of cancer. A cervical cancer may take 10 or more 
years to develop, during which time the cells of the lining of the cervix may show pre-
cancerous changes which can be detected by a Pap smear (also called Pap test), 
allowing for early treatment with an excellent chance of a full recovery.  
 
Since 1991 there has been a concerted effort in Australia to recommend and 
encourage women to have Pap smears every two years. The National Cervical 
Screening Program (NCSP) aims to reduce morbidity and deaths from cervical cancer 
through an organised approach to screening, incorporating state based registries, 
information for general practitioners and women and quality assurance programs 
relating to all aspects of cervical cancer screening. The NCSP encourages women in 
the target population to have regular Pap smears and is jointly funded by 
Commonwealth and State/Territory governments.  
 
Deaths from cervical cancer fell by 40% between 1986 and 1998. Since the NCSP 
was first introduced in 1991, cervical cancer has fallen from the eighth to the 
fourteenth most common cancer among Australian women and participation in 
screening, defined as those women who regularly screen, is now close to 70%. In 
addition, performance standards and guidelines have been developed for laboratories 
reporting cervical cytology and histopathology, management and follow-up of women 
with screen-detected abnormalities and colposcopies. Since 1999, all States and 
Territories have in place cervical cytology registers (Pap Test Registers or PTR).  
 
In assessing the success of the NCSP it is relevant to explore the determinants of 
screening for cervical cancer among women and the specific question of whether 
screening is associated with socio-economic status. Accessibility to health services 
remains a core goal in health policy in Australia but evidence on whether the goal is 
being met is limited. 
 
While there is considerable interest in frequency of screening and the NCSP has 
emphasised screening every two years, ensuring wide coverage is also a major 
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According to the NCSP, three out of four women who develop cervical cancer each 
year have never had a Pap smear or not had one within the recommended two yearly 
interval (see http://www.cervicalscreen.health.gov.au/facts/index.html). Thus 
explaining initial screening choice is an important aspect of screening behaviour.  
 
While the number of women who are unaware of pap tests is not large, they represent 
a large proportion of those women who have never screened, and the most recent data 
suggest that a substantial minority remain unaware. As such we also investigate the 
sensitivity of the econometric analysis and the resultant inferences to the treatment of 
those women in the sample who contend that they have never heard of a Pap test. Of 
independent interest is the characterisation of this group of women. Again, given 
coverage is a key objective of the NCSP, these are an important group of women to 
study.  
 
2. Demand for screening 
The theoretical framework for the empirical work follows from Kenkel’s (1990, 1991, 
1994, 2000) analysis of the demand for preventive care. Consumption of health care is 
regarded as an investment in health human capital (Grossman, 1972). However, 
treatment services provide both immediate benefits in terms of symptom relief and a 
potential increase in the stock of health capital. Preventive care can be regarded more 
purely as an investment in an individual’s stock of health capital. It is more 
appropriately modelled under conditions of uncertainty. 
 
In defining preventive medical care, Kenkel (2000) distinguishes between primary 
prevention, which reduces the probability of illness, and secondary prevention, which 
reduces the consequences of illness through early detection, without necessarily 
affecting the occurrence of disease. Screening services are secondary prevention. For 
example, cervical screening is aimed at detection and treatment of pre-cancerous 
lesions, avoiding the development of invasive cancer. Secondary prevention has also 
been seen as “self-insurance” (Erlich and Becker, 1972), pointing to a possible 
substitution between preventive care and curative care. 
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2000) identifies and tests empirically a range of factors that are likely to determine 
demand for secondary prevention services such as cervical screening. Increasing age 
is predicted to increase the demand for many preventive services because of increased 
risk of disease (depreciation of health capital), but this is offset by the potential impact 
of a perceived shorter payoff period for any investment. Kenkel (1994) found that the 
demand for preventive care (measured as use of breast and/or cervical cancer 
screening) decreased with age. Higher incomes are also expected to be associated with 
higher demand for preventive services, not just because of an income effect, but also 
because higher incomes are indicative of greater investment in human capital, and 
therefore higher costs associated with depreciation of human capital through ill health.  
 
The relationship between insurance coverage and demand for preventive care is 
complicated by issues of whether the insurance is for curative care or also covers 
preventive care and the extent to which preventive care is self insurance. That is, there 
will be cross price effects if insurance reduces the cost of both preventive and curative 
care, but curative care and secondary prevention may be complements rather than 
substitutes. Further, insurance coverage may be endogenous. Empirically, insurance is 
generally found to increase demand for preventive care or preventive behaviour 
(Kenkel, 1994).  
 
Of particular interest to the current study is the impact of health information, 
knowledge and schooling on demand for preventive care. It has generally been found 
that higher levels of schooling are associated with higher demand for medical care, 
particularly preventive care and with increased preventive health behaviours (Kenkel, 
1991, 1994; Mullahy, 1999). Higher levels of education may increase the efficiency of 
household production of health, but the effect of this on demand for preventive care is 
ambiguous.  
 
What decisions an individual consumer makes about preventive care is likely to be 
influenced by the type and amount of information she receives and is able to use. 
This, in turn, may be related to higher levels of education. For example, education 
may reduce the costs of acquiring health information and may increase an individual’s 
ability to understand and act on information about preventive care. Kenkel (1990) has 
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information seems to have little impact on how much care is consumed. His research 
also showed that women who are better informed are more likely to demand 
preventive care. Education may be related to screening via other mechanisms. Kenkel 
(2000) hypothesises that schooling may influence demand for preventive care via an 
improvement in allocative efficiency, that is better knowledge about the relationship 
between health inputs and health will lead to increased allocation of resources to 
health inputs. An alternative explanation of the impact of education is that both higher 
levels of schooling and higher demand for preventive care are indicative of a lower 
rate of time preference. 
 
The current study considers the relationship between awareness of cervical screening 
and demand for cervical screening. Awareness is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for screening. Awareness will be related to health knowledge, to factors 
affecting the acquisition of health information and to education, but is also likely to be 
influenced by other factors such as culture and language. 
 
3. Modelling awareness and choice 
In order to translate the demand for screening into an econometric model consider two 
latent variables representing the propensities of the i
th woman to be aware of Pap tests 
and to choose to have a Pap test. Denote the latent variable representing choice by y1* 
and that representing awareness by y2* and assume a model specification of the form: 
 
ji j ji ji u x y + ′ = β * ) 1 (;   j =1, 2 
 
where the realization of the latent variable yji* is defined by yji = 1 if yji* > 0 and yji = 
0 otherwise and xji are vectors of socio-demographic characteristics affecting the 
choices of the i
th woman. Under the assumption that the disturbance term (u1i, u2i) is 
bivariate normal with: 
 
var (uji) = 1 and cov (u1i, u2i) = ρ  
 
(1) specifies a bivariate probit model. The sample selection or censored probit variant 
of this model occurs when both y1 and y2 are observed only if y2 = 1. Thus, only for 
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screening or not. Several other variants of a bivariate probit model with partial 
observability are discussed in Meng and Schmidt (1985). 
 
Given this structure, univariate probit analyses of screening choice will typically 
produce inconsistent estimates of the model’s coefficients. If the available data allow 
us to separate those women who are aware and this sub-sample is used to estimate the 
screening model then this “sub-sample” probit analysis will produce inconsistent 
parameter estimates unless ρ = 0. Only in this case will there be no self-selection 
problem. In some cases there is no information that enables this split of the sample. If 
the awareness question is not asked and women are simply asked whether they have 
ever had a Pap test or not then those women who are unaware will be treated as non-
screeners. In this case, “full-sample” probit will also produce inconsistent parameter 
estimates because of the inflation of the number of non-screeners in the sample.  
 
It is important to emphasize here that we are interested in potential outcomes. If 
unaware women were made aware of Pap tests, would they choose to screen or not? 
Only in the extreme case that all unaware women would choose not to screen would 
the “full-sample” probit yield consistent parameter estimates. This concentration on 
potential outcomes is somewhat controversial. In health economics, it was a key part 
of vigorous exchanges between proponents of two-part and self-selection models; see 
Jones (2000) for a summary. 
 
A simple example will provide us with a comparison of these three alternative 
approaches to the estimation of screening behaviour and of the factors affecting the 
extent of the inconsistencies. Previous studies of sample selection with a continuous 
censored variable [see for example Nelson (1984), Zuehlke and Zeman (1991) and 
Leung and Yu (1996)] have isolated the degree of censoring and dependence between 
the disturbances as key factors in any comparison of alternative estimators. Suppose 
there is a single explanatory variable x governing both awareness and screening and 
that  x is a dummy variable taking on a value of unity with probability 0.5. This 
abstracts from another key factor in these comparisons, namely the degree of 
correlation between the explanatory variables in the censoring and outcome equations. 
However, this simplification enables us to more easily isolate some stylised results.  
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Given parameter values β11= 0, β12= 1, β22= -1, there are two parameters that are left 
to vary. The degree of censoring is governed by β21 while the correlation between 
screening choice and awareness is measured by ρ. Table 1 provides the probability 
limits of sub-sample and full-sample probit estimates of the parameter of interest (β12) 
for a range of β21 and ρ values. The MLE associated with the censored probit model 
serve as the base as they are consistent producing a probability limit equal to the true 
value of β12 which has been set to unity. See Appendix 1 for further details. 
 
These results indicate that the inconsistency of both sub-sample and full-sample probit 
increases with the degree of censoring (as indicated by smaller values of β21). The 
inconsistency of sub-sample probit increases with the magnitude of the correlation 
between awareness and screening choice (as measured by ρ). Full-sample probit 
always underestimates β12 and the degree of underestimation varies inversely with ρ. 
Sub-sample probit typically dominates full-sample probit except when ρ is close to 
unity.  
 
Table 1: Inconsistency of alternative probit estimators 
 













-1.0  0.48 -0.41 0.88  0.48  0.98  0.91 
-0.8  0.51 -0.39 0.88  0.48  0.98  0.91 
-0.6  0.60 -0.35 0.89  0.48  0.98  0.91 
-0.4  0.72 -0.30 0.91  0.49  0.99  0.91 
-0.2  0.85 -0.25 0.95  0.52  0.99  0.92 
0.0  1.00 -0.20 1.00  0.55  1.00  0.92 
0.2  1.17 -0.15 1.07  0.59  1.01  0.94 
0.4  1.39 -0.10 1.15  0.63  1.03  0.95 
0.6  1.71 -0.06 1.27  0.69  1.05  0.97 
0.8  2.29 -0.01 1.46  0.77  1.08  0.99 
1.0 nd  0.00 nd  1.00  1.08  1.00 
Notes: (a) Entries represent probability limits of alternative estimators of β12= 1. 
(b) nd = not defined. 
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In some circumstances, there can be a trade-off between censoring and dependence. 
The magnitude of the inconsistency can be relatively large even for moderate or minor 
censoring if at the same time dependence is strong. Only when both censoring and 
dependence are minor does sub-sample probit produce reliable estimates.  
 
When the sample split into aware and unaware is unknown, full-sample probit is 
associated with small inconsistencies only when censoring is minor and dependence is 
strongly positive. In other cases it may be possible to improve matters by considering 
alternatives to the full-sample probit. In terms of econometric structure, the problem is 
similar to that which occurs with a mis-classified binary dependent variable. See 
discussion by Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) and Hsiao and Sun 
(1999) for alternative estimation procedures in this situation.  
 
4. Data  
Data from the 1995 National Health Survey conducted by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) is used for the current analysis. This is a comprehensive national 
survey on health-related issues covering approximately 23,000 Australian households. 
There are a number of exclusions that are performed in order to produce the final data 
set used in our econometric work. While all participants answered a large common 
block of questions, the sample is essentially divided into two parts in order to 
concentrate on different aspects of health. In particular, approximately thirty percent 
of the NHS sample who responded to a General Health and Wellbeing (SF36) 
questionnaire were not asked questions relating to private health insurance, 
educational qualifications obtained since leaving high school, and were not eligible 
for inclusion in the sub-sample asked questions specifically about women’s health 
issues. A further 138 adult dependents were excluded. These are typically full-time 
students. After these exclusions the sample consists of 9,232 women. Finally, 263 
women were excluded because they did not have valid answers for the questions on 
Pap smears, leaving a sample of 8,969 that was used in our analyses. 
 
Table 2 provides a brief description of the variables to be used in the analyses. The 
two endogenous variables are whether or not a woman has ever heard of a Pap test 
and whether or not they have ever had a Pap test. We expect awareness to be affected 
by personal characteristics including, age, language proficiency, ethnicity, education 
  9and income. Because individual income is available, the income of the spouse is 
included as a separate variable rather than aggregating to yield household income. The 
same characteristics are also likely to impact on screening choice. Additional factors 
likely to explain screening choice include whether the woman has private health 
insurance, their family status, their general health status and the presence of risk 
factors such as whether they are a smoker or not.  
 
Because of item non-response, there is a potential problem with the income variables. 
The data set contained missing observations on at least one of the income questions 
for approximately 13% of all observations. At this stage these data have not been 
excluded but have been identified via two dummy variables (INCMISS and 
SINCMISS) that were constructed to indicate the presence of missing income and 
missing spouse income. 
 
Table 2 presents variable means for three relevant sub-samples of the data: those who 
were unaware of Pap tests and those who were aware of Pap tests divided into 
screeners and non-screeners. From Table 2 we see that 7,767 women have ever 
screened representing a screening rate compared to the full sample of 86.6%. While 
only 4.3% of the total sample were not aware of Pap tests, these 389 women represent 
32.4% of the 1,202 women in the sample who have never screened.  
 
There are several key features that distinguish the sub-sample who were unaware of 
Pap tests from those who were aware. The unaware are much older and are less 
healthy. They are poorer and, therefore, not surprisingly are less likely to have private 
health insurance. Because they are much less likely to be Australian born they also 
tend to have poorer English skills. The most striking difference in terms of country of 
birth is the relatively large proportion of Asian-born women amongst those who were 
unaware of Pap tests. 
 
Some, but not all, of the characteristics useful in distinguishing between the unaware 
and aware women emerge as key discriminators when characterizing non-screeners 
versus screeners in the aware sub-sample. Those people who screen tend to be better 
educated, richer and more likely to have private health insurance. However, there is 
little difference in terms of age, health status, ethnicity and English aptitude. 













   n=389  n=813  n=7,767 
PAPSMEAR  1 if ever screened  0.00 0.00 1.00 
PAPAWARE  1 if aware of pap tests  0.00 1.00 1.00 
AGE  Age in years  50.09 44.94 43.19 
AGE2024  1 if 20-24 years old  0.16 0.22 0.09 
AGE2529  1 if 25-29 years old  0.08 0.09 0.12 
AGE3034  1 if 30-34 years old  0.06 0.04 0.13 
AGE3539  1 if 35-39 years old  0.05 0.04 0.13 
AGE4044  1 if 40-44 years old  0.04 0.04 0.12 
AGE4549  1 if 45-49 years old  0.05 0.03 0.11 
AGE5054  1 if 50-54 years old  0.03 0.02 0.08 
AGE5559  1 if 55-59 years old  0.06 0.03 0.06 
AGE6064  1 if 60-64 years old  0.06 0.04 0.05 
AGE6569  1 if 65-69 years old  0.10 0.07 0.05 
AGE7074  1 if 70-74 years old  0.07 0.08 0.04 
AGE7579  1 if 75-79 years old  0.07 0.08 0.02 
AGE80PL  1 if 80 years old or more  0.11 0.09 0.01 
INC  Personal income $’000  10.28 12.86 15.58 
INCMISS  1 if income missing  0.09 0.07 0.10 
SINC  Personal income of spouse $’000  6.80 5.97  18.66 
SINCMISS  1 if spouse income missing  0.06 0.04 0.08 
HLTHEX  1 if self-reported health excellent  0.16 0.18 0.21 
HLTHVG  1 if self-reported health very good  0.22 0.36 0.36 
HLTHG  1 if self-reported health good  0.37 0.27 0.28 
HLTHF  1 if self-reported health fair  0.20 0.14 0.11 
HLTHP  1 if self-reported health poor  0.05 0.05 0.03 
TERT  1 if tertiary qualifications  0.05 0.10 0.14 
DIPLOMA  1 if diploma  0.07 0.06 0.10 
TRADE  1 if trade qualification  0.12 0.14 0.18 
KIDS  1 if have dependent children  0.18 0.09 0.44 
SINGLE  1 if single  0.56 0.69 0.31 
HPHI  1 if have private health insurance  0.24 0.33 0.41 
SMOKE  1 if current smoker  0.24 0.33 0.48 
QUIT  1 if quit smoking  0.14 0.16 0.25 
EXENG  1 if able to speak English  0.68 0.94 0.97 
ENGLISH  1 if usually speaks English  0.61 0.91 0.95 
ENGEXENG  EXENG*ENGLISH  0.58 0.88 0.94 
AUBORN  1 if born in Australia  0.48 0.74 0.75 
NUBORN  1 if born in New Zealand or UK  0.06 0.10 0.11 
SEBORN  1 if born in Southern Europe  0.14 0.04 0.04 
WEBORN  1 if born in Western Europe  0.01 0.01 0.02 
ASBORN  1 if born in Asia  0.26 0.07 0.04 
OTBORN  1 if born in other countries  0.05 0.04 0.04 
NSW  1 if reside in NSW  0.18 0.15 0.15 
VIC  1 if reside in VIC  0.34 0.27 0.25 
SA  1 if reside in SA  0.12 0.18 0.16 
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WA  1 if reside in WA  0.11 0.12 0.10 
TAS  1 if reside in TAS  0.04 0.04 0.05 
NT  1 if reside in NT  0.07 0.04 0.07 
ACT  1 if reside in ACT  0.07 0.10 0.09 
BRISBANE  1 if reside in Brisbane  0.04 0.05 0.06 
OTQLD  1 if reside in QLD but not Brisbane  0.03 0.04 0.05 
METRO  1 if reside in metropolitan area  0.65 0.58 0.53 
RURAL  1 if reside in rural area  0.05 0.08 0.07 
REMRURAL  1 if reside in remote rural area  0.10 0.11 0.14 
       
 
For several of the characteristics, the pattern across the three sub-samples is less clear-
cut. In terms of family structure, aware screeners are much less likely to be single than 
either those women who are unaware or those who are aware but have never screened. 
Screeners are also much more likely to have children and to be smokers than the other 
two groups. Given identified risk factors associated with cervical cancer these patterns 
are not surprising. 
 
5. Estimation results 
Estimation results for our censored probit model are provided in Table 3. The estimate 
for  ρ indicates strong positive correlation between awareness and choice. The 
associated Wald-test for ρ suggests a highly significant estimate although Nawata and 
McAleer (2001) demonstrate, in the context of a standard self-selection model, that 
this test tends to over-reject the null of no correlation. If instead, the LR test is used, 
as they recommend, the Chi-squared test statistic is 5.09 with an associated p-value of 
0.024, which also supports the need to use the censored probit approach. The extent of 
the biases that would result from ignoring this correlation will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
In order to counteract the missing income, the modified zero-order technique has been 
used. The INCMISS and SINCMISS dummy variables were included as explanatory 
variables in all equations and when missing, the income variables were coded as zero. 
While we know of no formal evaluations of the use of the modified zero-order 
technique in discrete choice models, we suspect that the method is likely to perform 
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only a few have missing observations and where the number of affected cases is 
substantial. See Greene (2000) and Maddala (1977) for further details of this method 
in the context of linear regression models. As a sensitivity check, the estimation was 
redone after deleting those observations where either INCMISS = 1 or SINCMISS = 
1. The results were qualitatively the same as those reported. 
 
First, consider the awareness equation where the sign pattern of the estimated 
coefficients largely conforms to a priori expectations. There is a distinct and precisely 
estimated age profile. Awareness steadily increases until the 40 to 44 age group then 
declines. The oldest women in the sample, those over 80, were much less likely to be 
aware of Pap tests than the reference group (18 to 19 year olds). Both English aptitude 
and whether English is normally spoken at home have large, distinct and significant 
impacts on awareness. The interaction effect moderates the impact of these two 
factors although it is not precisely estimated. The Asian effect identified in the 
summary statistics remains after controlling for all other factors. Asian women are 
much less likely to be aware of Pap tests relative to all other ethnic groups. Education 
does have some impact after controlling for all other factors in that women with 
tertiary education are somewhat more likely to be aware than women with diploma, 
trade or no qualifications. After controlling for other factors, personal income does 
not appear as a significant determinant of awareness but the income of the woman’s 
spouse does have a positive and significant impact. Coefficients associated with 
spatial effects were typically not precisely estimated with Northern Territory having 
the largest impact and being the only coefficient to be significant. This indicated that 
women in the Northern Territory were less aware than women in metropolitan New 
South Wales that served as the base. 
 
For the screening choice equation one needs to be careful with the interpretation of 
the coefficients. Screening choice needs to be considered jointly with awareness and 
hence coefficients cannot immediately be linked to marginal responses for the 
appropriate conditional or joint probability. In the first instance we simply report on 
the relative size and significance of the coefficients in the screening choice equation 
and later augment the discussion with an overview of how these results impact on the 
joint probabilities.  
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a  Standard 
Error 
Constant 0.1198  0.1856  -0.9037***  0.2465 
AGE2024 0.1582  0.1370  0.7432***  0.1030 
AGE2529 0.5684***  0.1547  1.1934***  0.1130 
AGE3034 0.7654***  0.1637  1.4378***  0.1275 
AGE3539 0.7529***  0.1662  1.3961***  0.1297 
AGE4044 0.9269***  0.1833  1.4358***  0.1297 
AGE4549 0.7382***  0.1716  1.5810***  0.1292 
AGE5054 0.8111***  0.1867  1.9219***  0.1490 
AGE5559 0.4537***  0.1653  1.5782***  0.1379 
AGE6064 0.3908**  0.1629  1.4844***  0.1350 
AGE6569 0.1547  0.1532  1.0932***  0.1230 
AGE7074 0.1236  0.1584  0.8906***  0.1220 
AGE7579 -0.1725 0.1619  0.5245***  0.1304 
AGE80PL -0.6013***  0.1574  0.1579 0.1413 
EXENG 0.5977***  0.1282  0.1306  0.1742 
ENGLISH 0.7334***  0.1905  0.2453  0.2200 
ENGEXENG -0.1286  0.2117  0.3018  0.2268 
NUBORN 0.1069  0.1098  -0.1104  0.0721 
SEBORN -0.2678**  0.1301  -0.1399  0.1202 
WEBORN 0.1898 0.2253  0.3856**  0.1772 
ASBORN -0.8189***  0.1102  -0.6041***  0.1114 
OTBORN -0.0050 0.1361  0.0280 0.1123 
TERT 0.2188*  0.1151  0.1204  0.0752 
DIPLOMA -0.0468  0.1058  0.0806  0.0822 
TRADE 0.0425  0.0813  0.1106*  0.0609 
INC 0.0036  0.0068  0.0145***  0.0046 
INQSQ 0.0000  0.0001  -0.0002**  0.0001 
INCMISS 0.0912  0.1196  0.2985***  0.0938 
SINC 0.0183***  0.0048  0.0030  0.0059 
SINQSQ -0.0002*  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 
SINCMISS 0.3407**  0.1324  -0.0049 0.1292 
VIC -0.0344  0.0834  -0.0757  0.0660 
SA 0.1481  0.0993  -0.0839  0.0735 
WA -0.1137  0.1063  -0.2225***  0.0818 
TAS -0.0163  0.1486  0.1490  0.1148 
NT -0.2325*  0.1246  0.1715  0.1156 
ACT 0.0965  0.1242  -0.0786  0.0903 
BRISBANE 0.0809  0.1505  0.0487  0.1090 
OTQLD 0.1645  0.1654  0.0267  0.1140 
RURAL 0.0988  0.1245  -0.0542  0.0857 
REMRURAL -0.0387  0.0919  -0.0142  0.0691 
HPHI    -0.0030  0.0457 
KIDS    0.6034***  0.0732 
SINGLE     -0.3692***  0.0904 
SMOKE    0.2305***  0.0577 
QUIT    -0.0269  0.0666 
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a  Standard 
Error 
HLTHEX     0.0821  0.1072 
HLTHVG     0.0787  0.1013 
HLTHG    0.1755*  0.1012 
HLTHF     0.0907  0.1070 














Notes: (a) *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
(b) Wald test for null hypothesis that all coefficients in the screening equation (except the intercept) are jointly 
zero; 1% critical value is 57.34. 
 
There is again a distinct and precisely estimated age profile with estimated age 
coefficients initially increasing before eventually declining. This is consistent with 
Kenkel’s (1994) findings and with a human capital model of demand for screening. 
Compared with the awareness equation, the peak occurs later in the 50 to 54 age 
group. Both English aptitude and whether English is normally spoken at home have 
positive impacts in the screening choice equation but, in contrast to the awareness 
results, these coefficients are not individually significant and the interaction effect is 
positive. While these individual coefficient estimates are not precisely estimated, a 
joint test of the hypothesis that the three language coefficients are each zero is easily 
rejected. The associated LR test statistic is 32.55 compared to a Chi-squared critical 
value of 11.34 at the 1% level. The Asian coefficient is again large and precisely 
estimated. With education, the base category is associated with no qualifications. All 
other categories indicate some form of education and all are associated with positive 
coefficients, consistent with Kenkel’s (1990, 1994) findings.  
 
Unlike the awareness equation there is a significant personal income effect but no 
significant impact of spouse’s income. Again, this is consistent with a human capital 
model of preventive services. Having private health insurance is not a significant 
determinant. Estimated coefficients for being single and having children are both 
significant, the former being negative and the latter positive. The estimated coefficient 
associated with current smokers is positive and precisely estimated but there is no 
significant difference between non-smokers and those that have quit smoking. General 
health status does not enter as a significant determinant in the screening choice 
  15equation. As with awareness there seem to be few spatial effects with the only 
significant impact associated with Western Australia.  
 
In order to gain further insights into the magnitude of some of these effects the results 
have been translated into impacts on probabilities. The probability of each of the three 
possible outcomes (unaware, aware non-screener and aware screener) was derived for 
each woman in the sample. Means of these estimated probabilities were then 
calculated over the entire sample and over selected groups of women. There are 
alternative ways to make such comparisons. Loosely speaking, this particular choice 
allows us to say compare an “average” Australian-born woman with an “average” 
Asian-born woman. These mean probabilities are provided in Table 4. 
 
While some of the age effects seemed quite large in the two estimated equations, 
levels of awareness and choice to be screened are quite high and hence these effects 
often do not translate into large probability differences. Women aged between 30 and 
60 are very similar. They have extremely high predicted probabilities of being aware 
and of having screened. As we move away from this group, predicted screening and 
awareness probabilities do decline substantially. In the case of younger women they 
are much more likely to be aware non-screeners than older women who tend to be 
non-screeners because of lack of awareness.  
 
Women who are Asian born or are non-English speaking or who do not usually speak 
English are at very high risk of being unaware which then translates into very low 
predicted screening probabilities. Each of these effects is large individually, and in 
addition the combined impact of being non-English speaking and of not usually 
speaking English is substantial. It is these women who are most at risk.  
 
The income comparisons have only been provided for couples, where overall, 
screening rates are higher than average. High income (defined as above the median 
income) for either of the couple implies high levels of awareness and screening. For 
low-income couples, awareness and screening are lower than the full sample averages 
although the magnitudes of the effects are not nearly as large as the impact of being 
Asian born or not being a natural English speaker.  
 













Full sample  8969  0.043  0.091  0.865 
        
18-19 years old  238  0.096  0.493  0.411 
20-29 years old  1950  0.046  0.127  0.826 
30-39 years old  2091  0.021  0.031  0.948 
40-49 years old  1835  0.017  0.031  0.952 
50-59 years old  1162  0.032  0.034  0.934 
60-69 years old  892  0.072  0.098  0.830 
70-79 years old  608  0.092  0.220  0.688 
80+ years old  193  0.226  0.366  0.408 
        
Australian born  6590  0.028  0.092  0.880 
Asian born  469  0.213  0.115  0.672 
        
English speaking
b 8233  0.027  0.088  0.885 
Able to speak English but 
usually don’t  319  0.129  0.147  0.724 
Usually speaks English but 
non-English speaking  106  0.144  0.202  0.653 
Non-English speaking  311  0.357  0.094  0.549 
        
High personal, high spouse 
income
c 1693  0.009  0.028  0.963 
High personal income, low 
spouse income  910  0.031  0.039  0.930 
Low personal income, high 
spouse income  1038  0.018  0.036  0.945 
Low personal, low spouse 
income 1214  0.071  0.082  0.847 
        
Notes: (a) Estimated probabilities for each of the three possible outcomes are computed for each woman and then 
averaged over those in the specified group.  
(b) The two binary variables that measure English language skills are used to divide the sample into four groups.  
(c) Income comparisons are for couples only where high and low incomes are defined relative to median personal 
and spouse incomes. 
 
 
6. A comparison of results  
Ultimately, the primary objective is to understand screening behaviour. With the type 
of data available to us, three alternative estimation procedures have been discussed. 
Results for the screening equation estimated by censored probit have already been 
provided in Table 3 while sub-sample and full-sample probit are provided in 
Appendix 2 as Table A1. Taking each of these three sets of estimates, screening 
probabilities have been estimated for all women in the sample. In Table 5 averages of 
  17these estimated screening probabilities have been calculated for the full sample and 
for selected sub-groups. 
 
The anticipated biases associated with sub-sample probit translate into large 
differences in estimated probabilities relative to those produced by censored probit. 
The former overstates the probability of screening for the entire sample and for each 
of the subgroups and the differences are quite substantial for the unaware and aware 
non-screeners. 
 












Full  sample  8969 0.878 0.898 0.866 
        
Unaware  389 0.657 0.737 0.605 
Aware  8580 0.888 0.905 0.878 
Aware  non-screeners 813 0.681 0.721 0.669 
Aware  screeners  7767 0.910 0.924 0.900 
Note: For each woman in each of the specified groups estimated probabilities of screening are determined using 
each of the three estimation procedures. Numbers reported are averages of these probabilities.  
 
In order to further illustrate these differences, kernel density plots have been 
generated for the estimated probabilities of screening for the unaware sub-group. 
These plots are provided in Figure 1. The difference between the censored probit and 
sub-sample probit plots is marked with the latter predicting a much larger proportion 
of women to be highly likely to screen. Censored probit predicts 72.0% of the 
unaware have a probability of screening greater than 0.5, while the sub-sample probit 
predicts this to be 83.5%.  
 
The full-sample probit results lead to average probabilities that are much closer to the 
censored probit results. The kernel density plots for censored and full-sample probit 
illustrate the closeness for the unaware sub-group. Because there is only a modest 
amount of censoring the biases introduced by assuming all unaware women are non-
screeners is less than that associated from ignoring the censoring problem. This is in 
accordance with our initial analysis of a stylised version of the problem that indicated 
full-sample probit is associated with small inconsistencies when censoring is minor 
and dependence is strongly positive. Both of these features are present in our data on 
screening behaviour in Australia. 
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Our censored probit results provide a clear picture of Australian women’s awareness 
of Pap tests and their propensity to ever screen for cervical cancer. While previous 
studies such as Taylor, Mamoon, Morrell and Wain (2001a,b) have recognised the 
role of age, socio-economic status and ethnicity in screening they have ignored issues 
associated with awareness and hence there is the potential for their results to be 
subject to the biases that we have discussed and illustrated.  
 
The resultant modelling approach also allows us to gain new insights into how the key 
determinants impact on screening behaviour. For example, it is generally accepted 
that certain ethnic groups and women with poor language skills are over-represented 
amongst the under-screened. Our analysis has highlighted that a key part of the story 
with these women is that they are very likely to be unaware of Pap tests and hence 
their appearance as non-screeners is not necessarily due to any reticence to screen if 
they knew about the existence and availability of the tests.  
 
From a methodological perspective we have emphasised the need to account for 
awareness in modelling choice. When the sample split into aware and unaware groups 
is unknown, one is forced to use full-sample probit. This may do a reasonable job of 
characterising choice probabilities, as it does in our particular case of screening, if 
  19censoring is modest and positive dependence between awareness and choice is 
substantial. But there is no guarantee that such favourable conditions will be 
applicable in other cases. In fact for newer screening programs, such as colorectal 
cancer screening, it is likely that awareness will be much lower, and that there would 
be correlation between awareness and the choice to screen. If in fact censoring was 
modest and dependence was minor then full-sample probit would likely be inferior to 
sub-sample probit. But to implement the latter requires knowing who is aware and 
who is not.  
 
Knowing the sample split allows one to make informed judgements about the 
appropriateness of alternative estimation procedures. Including questions in surveys 
that determine awareness is to be encouraged even when choices involve mature and 
well-known products or services as was the case here. Naturally, the incentives are 
even stronger when lack of awareness is likely to be widespread as in say a new test 
or procedure.  
 
  20References 
Ehrlich, I. and Becker, G. (1972), “Market insurance, self-insurance and self-
protection”, Journal of Political Economy 80, 623-649. 
Greene, W.H. (2000), Econometric Analysis, (4
th ed.), Macmillan Publishing 
Company, New Jersey. 
Grossman, M. (1972), “On the concept of health capital and the demand for health”, 
Journal of Political Economy 80, 223-255. 
Hausman, J.A., Abrevaya, J. and Scott-Morton, F.M. (1998), “Misclassification of 
dependent variable in discrete-choice setting”, Journal of Econometrics 87, 
239-270. 
Hsiao, C. and Sun, B.-H. (1999), “Modeling survey response bias – with an analysis 
of the demand for an advanced electronic device”, Journal of Econometrics 
89, 15-40. 
Jones, A.M. (2000), “Health econometrics”, Ch. 6 of A.J. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse 
eds., Handbook of Health Economics, North Holland. 
Kenkel, D.S. (1990) “Consumer health information and the demand for medical care”, 
Review of Economics and Statistics 72, 587-95. 
Kenkel, D.S. (1991) “Health behaviour, health knowledge and schooling”, Journal of 
Political Economy 99, 287-385. 
Kenkel, D.S. (1994), “The demand for preventative medical care”, Applied Economics 
26, 313-25. 
Kenkel, D.S. (2000), “Prevention”, Ch. 31 of A.J. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse eds., 
Handbook of Health Economics, North Holland. 
Leung, S.F. and Yu, S. (1996), “On the choice between sample selection and two-part 
models”, Journal of Econometrics 72, 197-229. 
Maddala, G.S. (1977), Econometrics, McGraw-Hill International Editions, Singapore. 
Meng, C.L. and Schmidt, P. (1985), “On the cost of partial observability in the 
bivariate probit model”, International Economic Review 26, 71-86. 
Mullahy, J. (1999), “It’ll only hurt a second? Microeconomic determinants of who 
gets flu shots”, Journal of Health Economics 8, 9-24. 
Nawata, K. and McAleer, M. (2001), “Size characteristics of tests for sample selection 
bias: A Monte Carlo comparison and empirical example”, Econometric 
Reviews 20, 105-112. 
Nelson, F. (1984), “Efficiency of the two-step estimator for models with endogenous 
sample selection”, Journal of Econometrics 24, 181-196. 
Taylor, Mamoon, Morrell and Wain (2001a), “Cervical screening in migrants to 
Australia ”, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 25, 55-61. 
Taylor, Mamoon, Morrell and Wain (2001b), “Cervical screening by socio-economic 
status in Australia”, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 25, 
256-260. 
van de Ven, W.P.M.M. and van Praag, B.M.S. (1981), “The demand for deductibles 
in private health insurance”, Journal of Econometrics 17, 229-252. 
van Soest, A., Kooreman, P. and Kapteyn, A. (1993), “Coherency and regularity of 
demand systems with equality and inequality constraints”, Journal of 
Econometrics 57, 161-188. 
Zuehlke, T.W. and Zeman, A.R. (1991), “A comparison of two-stage estimators of 
censored regression models”, Review of Economics and Statistics 73, 185-189. 
 
  21Appendix 1: Inconsistency of alternative probit estimators 
Our approach follows that used by van Soest, Kooreman and Kapteyn (1993) in a 
related context. In the simple two-equation system given in (2) there is a single 
explanatory variable x governing both awareness and screening and it is a dummy 
variable taking on a value of unity with probability 0.5. Three parameter values are set 
at particular values:  
 
β11 = 0, β12 = 1, β22 = -1; 
 
while two parameters are varied: 
 
β21 = 1, 2, 3 and ρ = -1.0, -0.8, …, -0.2, 0, 0.2, …, 0.8, 1.0.  
 
Assuming β11 is known to be zero, the log-likelihood functions of sub-sample and 
full-sample probit will only be a function of β12. For full-sample probit the (pseudo) 
log-likelihood is given by: 
 




i x y x y L  
 
while the sub-sample probit counterpart will have the same structure but will involve 
likelihood contributions only from the subset of the observations that are not 
censored. 
 
For any choice of (β21, ρ), the population probabilities of possible outcomes can be 
determined and are defined as follows:  
 
  π10 = Pr[y2 = 0 | x = 0];  π11 = Pr[y2 = 0 | x = 1];  
  π20 = Pr[y1 = 0, y2 = 1 | x = 0];  π21 = Pr[y1 = 0, y2 = 1 | x = 1]; 
  π30 = Pr[y1 = 1, y2 = 1 | x = 0];  π31 = Pr[y1 = 1, y2 = 1 | x = 1]. 
 
These are the probabilities that would enter the log-likelihood for the censored probit 
formulation that we have assumed is the true model and if estimated would produce 
consistent estimates of all unknown parameters. What is of interest is the behaviour of 
two single-equation probit models. 
 
Let Πhk be the number of observations associated with each of the h = 1,2,3 outcomes 
for each of the two values of x = k. If the total number of observations is 2N, then: 
 
  hk hk
N
N p π = Π
∞ →
) / ( lim . 
 
Using the true probabilities of each possible outcome, the probability limits of the 
(pseudo) log-likelihood functions of the mis-specified probit models can be 
determined. For full-sample probit this yields: 
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Because maximizing this function will give the same result as you would obtain from 
a simple binomial choice probit model, it is a simple matter to determine the 
probability limit of the resultant estimator of β12. Suppose β21= 2, and ρ = 0.4, then 
π11 = 0.159, π21 = 0.105, π31 = 0.736, and thus the required probability limit solves 
Φ(β12) = 0.736 which yields the full-sample probit entry of 0.63 given in Table 1 for 
this case.  
 
Following the same approach, the (pseudo) log-likelihood function for sub-sample 
probit is given by: 
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Again this will produce the same estimates as a simple binomial choice probit model. 
Continuing the previous example, the required probability limit solves Φ(β12) = 




  23Appendix 2: Extra estimation results 
 
Table A1: Sub-sample and full-sample probit 
 





a  Standard 
Error 
Constant -0.4208*  0.2185  -1.1930***  0.1825 
AGE2024 0.7615***  0.1052  0.7300***  0.0994 
AGE2529 1.1749***  0.1166  1.1590***  0.1092 
AGE3034 1.4057***  0.1325  1.3698***  0.1208 
AGE3539 1.3630***  0.1350  1.3449***  0.1231 
AGE4044 1.3827***  0.1345  1.3985***  0.1250 
AGE4549 1.5599***  0.1332  1.5136***  0.1218 
AGE5054 1.9117***  0.1525  1.8161***  0.1343 
AGE5559 1.6042***  0.1385  1.4789***  0.1238 
AGE6064 1.5159***  0.1358  1.4012***  0.1223 
AGE6569 1.1313***  0.1241  1.0385***  0.1147 
AGE7074 0.9221***  0.1244  0.8650***  0.1166 
AGE7579 0.5972***  0.1325  0.5054***  0.1236 
AGE80PL 0.3112**  0.1413  0.1240  0.1298 
EXENG -0.1555  0.1568  0.3598***  0.1155 
ENGLISH -0.0621 0.2093  0.4997***  0.1672 
ENGEXENG 0.5195** 0.2265 0.0812  0.1837 
NUBORN -0.1353*  0.0732  -0.0792 0.0682 
SEBORN -0.1037  0.1280  -0.1242  0.1060 
WEBORN 0.3776**  0.1864  0.3830**  0.1641 
ASBORN -0.4638***  0.1124  -0.6705***  0.0912 
OTBORN 0.0134  0.1181  0.0446  0.1034 
TERT 0.0923  0.0773  0.1386*  0.0711 
DIPLOMA 0.0913 0.0860  0.0636 0.0760 
TRADE 0.1088*  0.0637  0.1047*  0.0570 
INC 0.0149***  0.0047  0.0132***  0.0043 
INQSQ -0.0002**  0.0001  -0.0001*  0.0001 
INCMISS 0.3134***  0.0973  0.2704***  0.0865 
SINC -0.0004  0.0060  0.0039  0.0053 
SINQSQ 0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 
SINCMISS -0.0707  0.1332  0.0424  0.1157 
VIC -0.0763  0.0693  -0.0796  0.0612 
SA -0.1158  0.0751  -0.0596  0.0680 
WA -0.2143**  0.0857  -0.2013***  0.0768 
TAS 0.1606  0.1202  0.1029  0.1060 
NT 0.2297*  0.1194  0.0700  0.0987 
ACT -0.1090  0.0928  -0.0460  0.0844 
BRISBANE 0.0320  0.1134  0.0600  0.1025 
OTQLD 0.0056  0.1182  0.0556  0.1087 
RURAL -0.0732  0.0885  -0.0262  0.0814 
REMRURAL -0.0084  0.0723  -0.0243  0.0647 
HPHI -0.0031  0.0492  0.0486  0.0445 
KIDS 0.6449***  0.0701  0.5910***  0.0613 
SINGLE -0.4041***  0.0940  -0.3280***  0.0811 
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Table A1: Continued 
 
 





a  Standard 
Error 
SMOKE 0.2485***  0.0601  0.2794***  0.0547 
QUIT -0.0254  0.0719  -0.0572  0.0654 
HLTHEX 0.0893  0.1162  0.0269  0.1048 
HLTHVG 0.0877  0.1100  0.0881  0.0997 
HLTHG 0.1908*  0.1098  0.0914  0.0987 
HLTHF 0.1032  0.1164  0.0461  0.1042 

















Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
 
 